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Abstract
Providing secure communications over the physical layer with the objective of achieving
perfect secrecy without requiring a secret key has been receiving growing attention within the
past decade. The vast majority of the existing studies in the area of physical layer security
focus exclusively on the scenarios where the channel inputs are Gaussian distributed. However,
in practice, the signals employed for transmission are drawn from discrete signal constellations
such as phase shift keying and quadrature amplitude modulation. Hence, understanding the
impact of the finite-alphabet input constraints and designing secure transmission schemes
under this assumption is a mandatory step towards a practical implementation of physical
layer security. With this motivation, this article reviews recent developments on physical
layer security with finite-alphabet inputs. We explore transmit signal design algorithms for
single-antenna as well as multi-antenna wiretap channels under different assumptions on the
channel state information at the transmitter. Moreover, we present a review of the recent results
on secure transmission with discrete signaling for various scenarios including multi-carrier
transmission systems, broadcast channels with confidential messages, cognitive multiple access
and relay networks. Throughout the article, we stress the important behavioral differences of
discrete versus Gaussian inputs in the context of the physical layer security. We also present
an overview of practical code construction over Gaussian and fading wiretap channels, and
we discuss some open problems and directions for future research.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication technologies have become an indispensable part of our ev-
eryday lives. As more and more data is being transmitted over wireless links, along with
the reliability of the transmission, ensuring security of information transfer has become a
challenging issue. Maintaining confidentiality of the transmitted data, preventing corrup-
tion of the transmitted information and verifying authenticity of communication are the
most important security requirements in a wireless network. Traditionally, protecting
confidentiality of data transmission is addressed via computation-based mechanisms
such as encryption. On the other hand, the security provided by these methods mainly
relies on the conjecture that the encryption function is difficult to invert, which is not
provable from a mathematical point of view. With the ever-increasing computing power,
encryption may no longer prevent information leakage to sophisticated adversaries.
Moreover, implementation of key-based secure communications requires complicated
protocols for key distribution and management, which is highly challenging to implement
in the cases of decentralized wireless networks.
Securing transmission at the physical layer is an alternative or a complement to the
cryptographic solutions. The basic idea is to exploit the inherent randomness of the
channel for achieving secrecy. Dissimilar to encryption based methods, in the schemes
employing physical layer security, no constraint is placed on the computational capability
of the eavesdropper. Furthermore, no key distribution/management is required in its
implementation.
During the past decade there has been an extensive growth of interest in studying the
capabilities of physical layer for securing communication. Several surveys and overview
papers are available describing the state-of-the-art on this topic. For instance, funda-
mentals of physical layer security are comprehensively explained in [1]- [6]. A review
of recent results ranging from point-to-point communications to multiuser scenarios
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3is given in [7]. The authors in [8] present a review of the recent research results on
physical layer security under channel state information (CSI) uncertainty in different
nodes. A comprehensive overview on various multiple antenna techniques in physical
layer security is provided in [9]. The potentials of physical layer security for safeguarding
data confidentiality in the fifth generation (5G) network is studied in [10] and two updated
summaries of the recent research results on physical layer security techniques for 5G
and next generation wireless networks are given in [11] and [12].
The existing literature reviews provide a comprehensive understanding of the fun-
damentals of physical layer security. However, less is said about the practical aspects.
Adoption of physical layer security techniques in the next generation networks requires
a number of important practical issues to be addressed. With this motivation, a high-
level review on these issues is provided in a recent IEEE Communications Magazine
paper [13]. While [13] provides the big picture, our objective in this survey is to shed
light on two important (and highly related) practical aspects, namely, secure transmission
with discrete signaling and practical code construction. We present a detailed review of
the related recent results, underline the important behavioral differences between the
Gaussian inputs and discrete signaling, and study the transmit signal design problem for
securing communications in a variety of scenarios. We also provide a review of recent
results on practical code design for secrecy, and make connections with the information
theoretic results with finite inputs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we provide a
description of the fundamental concepts in physical layer security including the wiretap
channel model and different secrecy metrics. In Section III, we discuss the differences
between the secrecy performance of constellation-constrained and Gaussian inputs over
Gaussian wiretap channels. An overview of secure multi-antenna transmission schemes
with finite-alphabet inputs is provided in Section IV. Sections V, VI and VII discuss the
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4scenarios with multi-carrier transmission, spread spectrum communications and multiuser
channels, respectively. Section VIII focuses on applications of physical layer security
techniques in the next generation wireless networks including 5G. An overview of the
practical code design approaches for secrecy is presented in IX, followed by concluding
remarks and future research directions in Section X. The organizational structure of this
paper is given in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1: The organizational structure of the paper.
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5Notation: Vectors and matrices are denoted with lowercase and uppercase bold letters.
Non-bold letters are used to denote scalar values and calligraphic letters denote sets. The
expectation and probability mass (or density) function of a random variable W is denoted
by EW{.} and PW (.), respectively. Pr(.) is used to denote the probability of an event.
An stands for a sequence of length n, i.e., An = {A(1),A(2), . . . ,A(n)}. The notation
CN (m,R) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian random vector with mean
vector m and covariance matrix R.
II. FUNDAMENTALS
The wiretap channel model, originally introduced by Wyner in [15], is the most basic
scenario in the study of physical layer security. In this model, while the sender Alice
wishes to transmit a message signal to a legitimate receiver Bob; a third party, Eve,
is present with the capability of eavesdropping on Alice’s signal. The channel between
Alice and Bob, and the channel between Alice and Eve are referred to as the main
channel and the eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. In physical layer security, one is
interested in transmitting in such a way to maximize the transmission rate over the main
channel while keeping the eavesdropper ignorant about the message. This leads to the
notion of secrecy capacity, which is defined as the maximum rate at which the transmitter
can use the main link so as to deliver its message to the legitimate receiver in a way that
the eavesdropper cannot successfully obtain any information about it. Characterization
of the secrecy capacity is one of the most fundamental problems in the literature of
physical layer security in that it can provide us with vital implications on how secure
transmission techniques can be designed.
A. Different Notions of Secrecy
Consider a transmitter who wishes to transmit a message M to a legitimate receiver
while trying to keep an eavesdropper ignorant about it. M is mapped to a codeword Xn
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6using a stochastic encoder with n denoting the number of channel uses. Then, Xn is
transmitted, and Y n and Zn are received at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively. The eavesdropper’s level of uncertainty is quantified using the equivocation
rate which is given by
Re = 1
n
H(M ∣Zn), (1)
which is nothing but a measure of how unlikely it is that the eavesdropper can infer source
information from its received signal. According to this definition, large equivocation rates
are equivalent to higher secrecy levels.
There are different metrics for measuring the secrecy guaranteed by a specific scheme
among which the information-theoretic ones are recognized as the strongest. Perfect
secrecy is achievable in a system if the message M and its corresponding encoder
output Xn are statistically independent [16]. This can be expressed as I(M ;Xn) = 0,
which means that the mutual information between the message and the encoded signal
is exactly zero. This is to say, the eavesdropper is not capable of recovering the message
via observation of the encoder output in view of the fact that this encoded signal does
not provide any information about it. For this form of secrecy to be guaranteed, a secret
key of the length at least equal to the length of the message should be used. However,
weaker requirements can be adopted for evaluation of the secrecy in practical scenarios.
One example of such notions is semantic secrecy, which is achieved if it is guaranteed
that Zn does not increase the probability of guessing an arbitrary function f of M (with
an arbitrary distribution PM ) by more than  > 0 if Adv(M ;Zn) < , where advantage
Adv(M ;Zn) is defined as
Adv(M ;Zn) =max
f,PM
(∑
zn
PZn(zn) max
fi∈supp(f)Pr(f(M) = fi∣zn)− maxfi∈supp(f)Pr(f(M) = fi)),
(2)
where supp(.) stands for the support of the function in its argument.
Assuming a uniform distribution for the message M , a system is called to operate
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7with strong secrecy if limn→∞ I(M ;Zn) = 0, which means that if we consider codewords
of n symbols being transmitted by Alice as Xn, the information leaked by observation
of the received vector Zn shall go to zero as n goes to infinity. On the other hand,
the condition limn→∞ 1nI(M ;Zn) = 0 is referred to as weak secrecy. In particular, weak
secrecy requires the asymptotic rate of information leakage to be sublinear in n. Different
notions of secrecy, which are used to measure the secrecy guaranteed by a specific
scheme are summarized in Table I.
TABLE I: Four notions of secrecy.
Notion Requirement
Perfect Secrecy [16] I(M ;Xn) = 0
Semantic Secrecy [14] Adv(M ;Zn) < 
Strong Secrecy [17] limn→∞ I(M ;Zn) = 0
Weak Secrecy [15] limn→∞ 1nI(M ;Zn) = 0
B. Secrecy Capacity of Single-Antenna Wiretap Channels
The notion of secrecy capacity was originally introduced by Wyner in [15] for de-
graded wiretap channels. In the scenario studied in [15], the main channel and the
eavesdropper’s channel are assumed to be discrete memoryless channels (DMCs) where
Eve’s observation of the transmitted signal is a degraded version of the signal received by
Bob. Wyner showed that, the secrecy capacity for this scenario can be expressed as the
difference of the mutual information between Alice and Bob with that of Alice and Eve,
maximized over all input distributions. An extension of the notion of secrecy capacity
to the case of additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels has been accomplished
in [18]. It is shown that, for the case of a Gaussian wiretap channel, nonzero secrecy
capacity can be attained if Bob receives the signal through a less noisy channel.
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8While the scenarios considered in [15] and [18] put the eavesdropper at a disadvantage,
Csisza´r and Ko¨rner have studied the problem of secrecy for non-degraded channels in
[19]. In this channel model, referred to as broadcast channel with confidential messages,
the message transmitted by Alice contains a common message intended to both Bob and
Eve as well as a secret message, which is intended for Bob only, and is needed to be
kept secret from Eve. It is shown that the secrecy capacity over a discrete memoryless
wiretap channel (DMWC) is given by
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU I(U ;Y ) − I(U ;Z), (3)
where U is an auxiliary random variable. With a given PY Z ∣X(y, z∣x), the secrecy
capacity is achieved by maximizing the difference of the mutual information terms
corresponding to the main and the eavesdropper’s channels over all joint distributions
PUX(u,x) where U satisfies the Markov chain relationship U →X → Y Z.
In order to study the physical layer security in wireless communication scenarios,
we need to extend the wiretap channel to a model that takes into account the fading
phenomenon. Assuming a narrowband transmission, fading is modeled as multiplicative
gains over the main and eavesdropper’s channels, denoted by HB and HE , respectively.
The first characterization of the role of fading in providing physical layer security is
given in [20] where quasi-static fading channels are considered towards the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. It is shown via analyzing the secrecy outage probability
that, in presence of fading, secure transmission is possible even in the scenarios where the
eavesdropper has a better SNR. The authors in [21] obtain the ergodic secrecy capacity
region for the fading broadcast channel with confidential messages (BCC) by deriving the
boundary achieving optimal power allocation strategies. The secrecy capacity over block
fading channels is derived in [22] under the assumption that each coherence interval is
long enough to allow for invoking proper random coding arguments. Given that the
transmitter knows either the main CSI (MCSI) or both the main and the eavesdropper
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9CSI (ECSI) perfectly, an achievable secrecy rate can be formulated as [22]:
Rs = EHB ,HE{[I(X;Y ∣HB) − I(X;Z ∣HE)]+}, (4)
where [a]+ = max{a,0}. It is shown in [22] that the secrecy capacity that is achieved
under the full CSI assumption serves as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity when
only MCSI is known at the transmitter. This is due to the fact that with the knowledge of
the instantaneous ECSI, transmitter is capable of realizing a more efficient transmission,
which provides additional gains in terms of secrecy rates. For instance, when perfect
knowledge of both channels are available, the transmitter can optimize the transmit
power according to the instantaneous values of the channel gains HB and HE , providing
a higher secrecy rate with respect to the case where the optimization of the transmit
power is carried out according to the main channel only.
Under the assumption that the transmitter does not know the realizations of the
channels, and it only has their statistics, assuming that each receiver knows its own
channel, the secrecy capacity can be obtained with the aid of the results for the case of
DMWC [19] as
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU I(U ;Y,HB) − I(U ;Z,HE), (5)
where U satisfies the Markov chain relationship U → X → (Y,HB), (Z,HE). This is
obtained by treating HB and HE as channel outputs at the legitimate receiver and at the
eavesdropper, respectively [23]. Using the chain rule of mutual information and noting
the fact that HB and HE are independent of X and U , the expression in (5) can be
modified as
Cs = max
PX∣U ,PU EHBI(U ;Y ∣HB) −EHEI(U ;Z ∣HE). (6)
Determining the optimal joint distribution PUX(u,x) and the resulting exact secrecy
capacity is an open problem, however, by ignoring the channel prefixing, the performance
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can be quantified using an achievable ergodic secrecy rate as given by
Rs = [EHBI(X;Y ∣HB) −EHEI(X;Z ∣HE)]+. (7)
C. Secrecy Capacity of Multi-Antenna Wiretap Channels
Multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) wiretap channel is an extension of the wiretap
channel to a scenario where all the nodes, namely, Alice, Bob and Eve, are equipped
with multiple antennas. Under the full CSI assumption, secrecy capacity for this setup
is determined independently by Khisti and Wornell [24], and Oggier and Hassibi [25].
The results in [19] are employed by Khisti and Wornell so as to develop a genie-aided
upper bound on the secrecy capacity in the general case of non-degraded MIMO wiretap
channels. While their characterization is through a saddlepoint, Oggier and Hassibi
propose an alternative approach through a single optimization process. It is shown in
both [24] and [25] that the achievable secrecy rate is maximized when the channel input
is Gaussian, and the secrecy capacity of a MIMO wiretap channel is given by
Cs = max
Kx⪰0,T r(Kx)=P log det(I +HBKxHHB ) − log det(I +HEKxHHE ), (8)
where Kx = E{xxH}, and HB ∈ CNB×Nt and HE ∈ CNE×Nt are the channel matrices
corresponding to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively.
An alternative characterization of the secrecy capacity of the MIMO wiretap channel
is presented by Liu and Shamai in [26] where they consider a more general matrix
constraint on the channel input. We highlight that, while [24]–[26] prove that the optimal
input is Gaussian, the optimal input covariance matrix needs to be determined using nu-
merical optimization approaches (see, e.g., [27]–[28]). A set of equations describing the
optimal channel input under partial CSI at the transmitter (CSIT) along with algorithms
for obtaining the solution are given in [29].
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D. Other Secrecy Metrics
Secrecy capacity is the most widely used measure for evaluation of the secrecy
performance. However, a complete characterization of the secrecy capacity region is
prohibitive in some scenarios. In such cases, alternative metrics can be adopted as
surveyed below.
1) Secrecy Outage Probability: Secrecy outage occurs when the instantaneous secrecy
capacity falls below a target secrecy rate Rs. In delay-critical applications and for
scenarios with quasi-static fading, encoding over multiple channel states is not possible.
In these cases, secure transmission schemes can be designed such that the probability of
occurrence of an outage event is minimized. Obviously, this serves as a weaker notion
than secrecy capacity. This is due to the fact that, with this formulation, secrecy is not
guaranteed for the entire transmission duration.
2) Error Probability Based Metrics: In a number of works on physical layer security,
secure transmission schemes are designed based on constraining the bit error rate at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper to pre-specified threshold values. This leads to
definition of a parameter called “security gap,” which quantifies the minimum required
difference between the received SNR values at Bob and Eve to ensure that the bit
error rate (BER) at Bob is smaller than a threshold while that at the Eve’s receiver
is larger than another threshold [30]. One may note that imposing a high BER at
the eavesdropper does not satisfy any of the requirements given in Table I. However,
security gap serves as a practical measure of secrecy in a number of applications such as
explicit and implementable code design for physical layer secrecy. Some studies (e.g.,
[31]) consider the difference in the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) at the
legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper as a secrecy metric. This is also a weak notion,
which does not guarantee secrecy in an information theoretic sense.
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
12
−15 −10 −5 0 5 10 15 20 25
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
SNR (dB)
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
ts/
co
mp
lex
 di
m.
)
 
 
BPSK
QPSK
16−PSK
16−QAM
64QAM
Gaussian
Fig. 2: Capacity of an AWGN channel with Gaussian and constellation-constrained
inputs.
III. GAUSSIAN WIRETAP CHANNELS WITH FINITE-ALPHABET INPUTS
The secrecy capacity achieving input distribution over a Gaussian MIMO wiretap
channel is proved to be Gaussian [18]. However, since Gaussian signals take on a
continuum of values, their detection complexity is considerably high. In addition, noting
that the amplitude the Gaussian signals is unbounded, these signals have high peak to
average power ratios. Accordingly, Gaussian signaling is not typically used in practice,
and instead the transmission is carried out with the aid of discrete inputs drawn from
standard constellations such as PSK or QAM. Hence, it is important to study the
implications of discrete signaling in the context of physical layer security.
As a first step in studying physical layer security under the finite-alphabet input
assumption, the impacts of standard constellations on the achievable secrecy rates of
Gaussian wiretap channels are studied in [32] and [33]. In [32], the authors evaluate
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
13
the constellation-constrained secrecy capacity and highlight an important behavioral
difference between finite-alphabet (e.g., PSK and QAM) and Gaussian inputs, that is, for
a fixed noise variance at Eve, the secrecy rate curves for PSK or QAM plotted against the
SNR have global maxima at finite SNR values. Investigation of the secrecy capacity of
the pulse amplitude modulation (PAM) inputs over a degraded Gaussian wiretap channel
in [33] leads to a similar conclusion. In addition, the authors in [33] demonstrate that
when finite constellations are employed, using all the available power for the information
bearing signal transmission may not be optimal. The reason behind these observations
has its roots in the mutual information expressions. That is, the capacity under an average
power constraint over an AWGN channel is given by
C = log2(1 + SNR), (9)
in bits per complex dimension, and it is an increasing function of the SNR. On the other
hand, the capacity of the constellation-constrained AWGN channel can be calculated as
[34]
I(X;Y ) = log2 ∣X ∣ −EX,Y ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩ log2 ∑x′∈X pY ∣X
′(y∣x′)
pY ∣X(y∣x)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭, (10)
where X is a constellation set and ∣X ∣ denotes its cardinality. Dissimilar to the capacity
expression in (9), the mutual information term in (10) converges to log2 ∣X ∣ at high SNRs
(see Fig. 2). This means that by increasing the transmit power, the mutual information
terms I(X;Y ) and I(X;Z) (calculated using (10)) will reach their saturation value, and
the secrecy rate drops to zero. This is also verified in Fig. 3, where the secrecy rates
are obtained by evaluating the difference of the mutual information terms corresponding
to the main and eavesdropper’s channels, under the assumption that the SNR at the
eavesdropper (denoted by SNRe) is lower than the legitimate receiver’s SNR (denoted
by SNRb) by 1.5 dB. This also clarifies that using all the available transmit power
for information transmission in the high SNR regime is not optimal [33]. Furthermore,
it can be observed from Fig. 3 that higher secrecy rates are achieved over Gaussian
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Fig. 3: Secrecy rates with PSK and QAM over a degraded Gaussian wiretap channel
(SNRE = SNRB − 1.5 dB).
wiretap channels by increasing the modulation orders. This is because by increasing the
modulation order, roughly speaking, the distribution of the channel input can be made
to resemble the optimal Gaussian signal more closely for a wider range of SNRs.
The impact of output quantization on the secrecy rate of binary-input Gaussian wiretap
channels is investigated in [35]. It is shown through a theoretical analysis that when the
legitimate receiver has unquantized inputs where the eavesdropper has (binary) quantized
outputs higher secrecy rates are achievable with respect to the case where both receivers
have binary quantized or unquantized outputs.
To conclude this section, we note that while it may be tempting to argue that, as in
the case of transmission over an AWGN channel with no security considerations, one
can design general transmission schemes using Gaussian codebooks and simply adopt
the ideas to the case of inputs from standard constellations (e.g., PSK, QAM, etc.),
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this approach does not extend in a straightforward manner to the case of physical layer
security. The optimal transmit signal design strategies under Gaussian input assumption
lead to considerable losses when applied to inputs drawn from standard constellations.
For instance, it is shown in [33] the optimal power allocation strategy with PAM inputs
is in sharp contrast to that of Gaussian inputs. This motivates development of new
algorithms and ideas for practical constellation-constrained channels to achieve security
at the physical layer.
IV. FADING AND MULTI-ANTENNA WIRETAP CHANNELS DRIVEN BY
FINITE-ALPHABET INPUTS
Fading introduces new potentials for securing communications at the physical layer.
Specifically, randomness due to channel fluctuations can be exploited opportunistically
by a transmitter to guarantee secrecy even in the scenarios where the eavesdropper
possesses a higher SNR (on average) than the legitimate receiver. Dissimilar to the
Gaussian wiretap channel where Gaussian input is secrecy capacity achieving, in the
presence of fading, discrete signaling may achieve higher secrecy rates. For instance, it
is shown in [36] that, when Bob’s channel gain is on average worse than that of Eve’s,
QAM inputs achieve higher secrecy rates at low and moderate SNR regimes. This is
because the discrete nature of QAM inputs limits the leakage at the eavesdropper whose
channel is unusually good. At sufficiently high SNRs, however, the secrecy rate with
QAM inputs drops to zero similar to what is observed for the case of Gaussian wiretap
channels.
Taking advantage of the spatial degrees of freedom introduced by multi-antenna trans-
mission can serve as an efficient solution to prevent secrecy rate of standard constellations
from dropping to zero at high SNRs. In the remainder of this section, we focus on a
system model where Alice, Bob and Eve are equipped with Nt, NB and NE antennas,
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
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Fig. 4: MIMO wiretap channel.
as depicted in Fig. 4. The received signals are given by
y = HBx + ny, (11)
z = HEx + nz, (12)
where HB and HE are the channel matrices corresponding to the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, respectively, while ny and nz denote circularly symmetric complex
AWGN vectors, elements of which follow CN (0, σ2ny) and CN (0, σ2nz), respectively.
Transmit precoding and artificial noise injection serve as important approaches for
enhancing secrecy [7]. Via precoding, it is possible to strengthen (or weaken) the trans-
mitted signals in certain directions. Accordingly, it can be used as an effective tool to
increase the quality difference between the signals received at the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper. Beamforming is a special case of precoding where the transmitter is
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restricted to using rank-one signals. It has a lower complexity with respect to the general
transmit precoding solution, achieved at the price of some performance loss. Furthermore,
injection of artificial noise [37] can degrade the reception at the eavesdropper effectively
while having no (or minimal) effect on the signal received at the legitimate receiver. We
also note that, to take advantage of the potentials offered by the channel fading, the
transmitter needs a certain level of knowledge on the CSI of both channels.
In what follows, we review the existing solutions for secure transmission over MIMO
wiretap channels with finite-alphabet inputs under different CSIT assumptions.
A. Transmit Signal Design with Full CSI
The most optimistic assumption regarding the transmitter’s CSI knowledge is avail-
ability of perfect instantaneous realizations of the channel matrices HB and HE . This
assumption is justifiable in the scenarios where Eve is an authorized user in the network,
however, she should be kept ignorant about the confidential messages transmitted from
Alice to Bob. In this case, the transmitter can take advantage of the full CSI knowledge
to design a precoder, which results in the maximal quality difference between the signals
received at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
With the aid of the perfect CSI corresponding to both channels, a generalized singular
value decomposition (GSVD) precoding solution is proposed in [38] using which the
MIMO multi-antenna eavesdropper (MIMOME) channel is converted into a bank of par-
allel channels, and a power allocation strategy is formulated to maximize the achievable
secrecy rate.
The necessary conditions for optimum transmit precoding is derived in [39], and it
is demonstrated that the GSVD precoding [38] is suboptimal. Alternatively, a gradient
descent optimization is proposed in which the precoder matrices are updated with steps
proportional to the gradient of the instantaneous secrecy rate. Furthermore, it is shown
that transmission along the null-space of the eavesdropper’s channel is the optimal secure
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
18
transmission strategy at the high-SNR regime. This is because, with a precoder matrix
along the null-space of the eavesdropper’s channel, her achievable rate is suppressed to
zero, and when the SNR is sufficiently high, the rate at the legitimate receiver approaches
the maximum value that can be achieved with the use of specific finite-alphabet inputs,
which guarantees that the secrecy rate is maximized. However, it should be noted that,
when the number of transmit antennas is less than or equal to the number of antennas
at the eavesdropper, it is not possible to suppress her information rate by transmitting
along the null-space of HE . Therefore, for maximizing secrecy rates, only part of the
available power should be allocated to data transmission. Given Nt > NB, the authors in
[39] suggest to use the excess power for transmission of an artificial noise signal along
the null-space of HB so as to prevent the secrecy rates from dropping to zero. Fig. 5
compares the achievable secrecy rates by the schemes proposed in [38] and [39] for a
wiretap channel with Nt = 2, NB = 1 and NE = 1, and fixed channels given by1
hB = [0.5128 − 0.3239j −0.8903 − 0.0318j] , (13)
hE = [0.3880 + 1.2024j −0.9825 + 0.5914j] . (14)
The precoding approach proposed in [39] outperforms the GSVD-based precoding [38].
This improved performance is attained at the price of increased computational complex-
ity. Furthermore, comparing the results given in Fig. 5 with those of Fig. 3 for QPSK
inputs over the Gaussian wiretap channel reveals the advantages offered by fading and
CSI-based precoding approaches.
An important conclusion that can be drawn from the results in [38] and [39] is that,
as in the case of non-fading channels, the structure of the optimal precoders under the
finite-alphabet input assumption is different from that of the precoders, which are optimal
for Gaussian inputs. For example, over MISO multi-antenna eavesdropper (MISOME)
1This example has also been considered in [39] and [40].
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Fig. 5: Secrecy rates with QPSK inputs over fixed channels given in (13) and (14).
channels, the optimal transmission strategy is beamforming along the eigenvector corre-
sponding to the largest generalized eigenvalue of (Hb,He) [40]. However, these precoders
(which correspond to signaling with rank one covariance), when applied to finite-alphabet
inputs, undergo a considerable loss with respect to the precoders specifically optimized
for this case (see, e.g., Fig. 7 in [39]).
As an alternative method to design a suboptimal precoder, one may also replace
the secrecy capacity with practical metrics (as opposed to those ensuring secrecy in
an information-theoretic sense) such as SINR-based metrics. For instance, the authors
in [41] design artificial noise beamformers, which serve as constructive interference to
the legitimate receiver (improving Bob’s SINR) while disrupting the reception at the
eavesdropper (degrading Eve’s SINR). In Table II, we summarize the precoder design
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approaches with full CSI.
TABLE II: Precoder design with full CSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
S. Bashar et al. [38] MIMOME Propose a GSVD-based precoding algorithm.
Y. Wu et al. [39] MIMOME Derive the necessary conditions for optimality of the precoder matrix and
develop a gradient descent based precoder optimization algorithm.
M. R. A. Khandaker et al. [41] MISO, multiple
Eves
Design artificial noise which is constructive to the legitimate receiver and
destructive to the eavesdroppers.
B. Perfect MCSI and Statistical ECSI
While availability of perfect ECSI at the transmitter may be practical in some limited
scenarios, in general, it is highly challenging to obtain it instantaneously. A more
practical assumption regarding CSIT is the availability of perfect MCSI along with the
statistical ECSI at the transmitter. On the other hand, the precoder design in this scenario
is not as effective as those carried out with the perfect knowledge of both channels. In
other words, with the absence of the instantaneous ECSI, precoding is not as forceful
in suppressing the reception at the eavesdropper. For instance, transmission along the
null-space of the eavesdropper’s channel is not even possible in this scenario.
An example of secure transmission scheme under perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI
is given in [43] where the authors consider a MISOME channel and define a practical
secrecy metric (instead of an information theoretic one), which quantifies the symbol
error probability of the confidential data, and show that in the absence of artificial noise,
secrecy diversity (i.e., the high-SNR slope of their defined metric) vanishes. This result
underlines the importance of artificial noise injection in these scenarios.
Artificial noise-aided transmit precoding strategies with the objective of maximizing
the secrecy rate are proposed in [44]–[47]. In [44], the authors employ naive beamforming
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
21
TABLE III: Precoder design with perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
T. V. Nguyen et al. [43] MISOME Define a weak notion of secrecy based on symbol error probability and
quantify the impact of artificial noise injection with beamforming on
diversity order.
S. Bashar et al. [44] MISOSE Employ a naive beamforming with the aid of MCSI only along with a
power optimization using perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI. The excess
power is used for artificial noise injection in the null-space of HB .
Y. Wu et al. [39] MIMOME Develops an iterative algorithm for precoder design and allocate the
excess power to inject artificial noise along the null-space of HB .
S. Rezaei Aghdam and
T. M. Duman [47]
MIMOME Propose a joint precoder and (generalized) artificial noise optimization
algorithm.
along with the artificial noise injection while considering single-antenna receivers. The
strategy proposed in [39], on the other hand, relies on an iterative maximization of an
approximation to the instantaneous secrecy rate. In both of these studies, it is shown that
the optimal schemes allocate only a fraction of the total power for signal transmission
at high SNRs. Hence, the remaining power is employed for artificial noise injection. It
is shown in [45] that jointly optimizing the precoder matrix and portion of the power
allocated to the artificial noise outperforms the solutions, which rely on optimizing the
precoder only. Moreover, inspired by the idea proposed in [46], a generalized artificial
noise aided transmission is introduced in [47], which guarantees high secrecy rates for
the scenarios with Nt < NE for which injection of artificial noise along the null-space of
the main channel is not possible. A summary of the existing solutions for the scenarios
with perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI at the transmitter is given in Table III.
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C. Perfect MCSI Only
In the scenarios with a passive eavesdropper, a realistic assumption is that the trans-
mitter does not know anything about the eavesdropper’s channel. Under this assumption,
[48] and [49] propose a secure transmission strategy referred to as directional modulation,
in which the amplitude and the phase of the transmit signal are adjusted by varying the
length of the reflector antennas for each symbol. This scrambles the PSK symbols in
all the directions other than that of the legitimate receiver. Other strategies for securing
communications without the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s channel are proposed in
[50] and [52]. Zhang et al. develop a Tomlinson-Harashima precoding in [50] where the
transmitter allocates part of its power in order to achieve a target mean squared error
(MSE) at the legitimate receiver, and the remaining power is used to transmit artificial
noise to degrade the eavesdropper’s reception. In [52], a secure space-time block coding
(STBC) scheme is proposed, which enables the legitimate receiver to perform separable
decoding, while requiring an exhaustive maximum likelihood (ML) detection at the
eavesdropper. Furthermore, the authors combine this scheme with artificial noise injection
to ensure a high uncoded BER at Eve. In [53], the authors propose a practical precoded
orthogonal STBC method for MISO wireless networks where space-time codewords
are precoded by matrix that minimizes the error rate at the legitimate receiver and
a pre-equalization step is added to take security requirements into account. Table IV
summarizes the existing transmit signal design approaches under perfect MCSI and no
ECSI at the transmitter.
D. Statistical MCSI and ECSI
While most of the existing physical layer security solutions rely on the assumption
that the transmitter is capable of estimating at least the instantaneous main CSI, in
some scenarios (e.g., for fast fading channels), it may be difficult for the transmitter
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
23
TABLE IV: Transmit signal design with perfect MCSI and no ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
A. Kalantari et al. [48],
[49]
MIMOME Steer the array beam such that the phase of the PSK modulated signal
is scrambled in directions other than Bob.
L. Zhang et al. [50] MIMOME Propose a nonlinear Tomlinson-Harashima precoding along with along
with artificial noise injection.
S. A. A. Fakoorian et
al. [52]
MIMOME Nt =
NB = 2, NE ≥ 1
Design a STBC which results in a high BER for Eve and a low BER
for Bob.
J. M. Hamamreh et al.
[53]
MISOSE Nt =
4,NB = NE = 1
Propose a precoded orthogonal STBC which minimizes BER at Bob
and is capable of satisfying security requirements.
to track the rapidly varying channel coefficients. For these cases, the impact of the
discrete inputs on the achievable secrecy rates is analyzed in [54]. Under the assumption
that both channels are doubly correlated, using the knowledge of transmit and receive
correlation matrices, transmit signal design algorithms are proposed in [55] to maximize
the resulting achievable secrecy rates. The results in [55] reveal that jointly optimizing
the precoder matrix and artificial noise results in increased achievable secrecy rates with
respect to precoding without artificial noise injection. The existing studies on MIMO
wiretap channels with statistical CSI are summarized in Table V.
We now compare the secrecy rates achieved by different transmit signal design ap-
TABLE V: Transmit signal design with statistical MCSI and ECSI.
Authors System Model Contributions
M. Girnyk et al. [54] MIMOME Derive large system approximation for secrecy rate under arbitrary
channel inputs and quantify it for Gaussian and finite-alphabet inputs.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and
T. M. Duman [55]
MIMOME Propose precoding and artificial noise injection approaches with the aid
of the knowledge on correlation matrices.
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proaches under different CSIT assumptions. In particular, we overview the results for the
scenarios with perfect or statistical CSI at the transmitter. When perfect CSI is available,
each element of HB and HE are modeled as independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d.) with CN (0, σ2B) and CN (0, σ2E), respectively. When considering the statistical
CSI corresponding to the main channel or the eavesdropper’s channel, a commonly
adopted model in the literature employs doubly correlated channels with
HB = Ψ1/2rB HˆBΨ1/2tB , HE = Ψ1/2rE HˆEΨ1/2tE , (15)
where the elements of HˆB and HˆE are i.i.d., and the transmitter is capable of acquiring
the transmit and receive correlation matrices, i.e., Ψtb, Ψte, Ψrb and Ψre, from the long-
term statistics of the channel. The perfect instantaneous CSI is available at the receivers,
including the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper.
Fig. 6 demonstrates the achievable secrecy rates by different transmission schemes
over a MIMOME wiretap channel with Nt = 4 and NB = NE = 2. Correlation matrices
are assumed to have exponentially decaying entries as
[Ψt(ρ)]ij = ρt∣i−j∣, i, j = 1,2, . . . ,Nt, (16)
[Ψr(ρ)]mk = ρr ∣m−k∣, m, k = 1,2, . . . ,NB (or, NE). (17)
It is demonstrated that the precoder design using a gradient descent optimization
approach [39], [47] is a promising strategy for maximizing the secrecy rates. Fig. 6 also
reveals the importance of CSIT. When perfect CSI corresponding to the eavesdropper is
available at the transmitter, it is possible to construct precoders, which are aligned with
the null-space of the eavesdropper’s channel. By this means, the achievable rate of the
eavesdropper can be suppressed to zero. Furthermore, even when only the statistical CSI
of the eavesdropper along with perfect CSI of the main user is available, high secrecy
rates are still achievable with the aid of appropriately designed artificial noise injection
strategies. However, in the absence of instantaneous CSI, the precoder matrices designed
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
25
SNR (dB)
-10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25
Er
go
di
c 
Se
cr
ec
y 
Ra
te
s 
(bi
ts/
s/H
z)
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Perfect MCSI and ECSI [33]
Perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI [39]- ρte = 0.8, ρre=0.8
Statistical MCSI and ECSI [47]- ρtb = 0.9, ρre=0.6, ρte = 0.8, ρre=0.8
Fig. 6: Secrecy rates with different transmit signal design algorithms under different
CSIT assumptions.
with the knowledge of correlation matrices are not capable of preventing the ergodic
secrecy rates from dropping to zero at high SNRs. In other words, since statistical CSI
does not provide sufficient degrees of freedom to take advantage of fading for improving
secrecy, the behavior is similar to that in AWGN channels described in Section III.
E. Transmit Signal Design Based on Channel Reciprocity
A group of transmission strategies in the literature of physical layer security rely on
the assumption of channel reciprocity, that is, the transmitter and the legitimate receiver
observe the same channel, simultaneously. For the systems working in time division
duplex (TDD) mode, this property can be used to allow the transmitter to obtain the MCSI
using the pilots transmitted from the legitimate receiver. In [56], a secure transmission
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scheme is proposed over a MIMO wiretap channel under the assumption that no training
signals are transmitted by Alice, and hence, no CSI is available at Bob or Eve. Alice
realizes an orthogonal space-time block coded PSK transmission and uses the CSI she
obtains from the reverse channel estimation to design a phase shifting precoder, which
compensates the phase shift by the channel. Therefore, Bob can recover the transmitted
messages with no need to CSI. On the other hand, Eve who observes an independent
channel can only recover the information with non-coherent detection, ensuring that this
strategy provides positive secrecy rates over MIMO wiretap channels.
In the scenarios with channel reciprocity, when channel estimation is carried out both
in the forward (from Alice to Bob) and the reverse (from Bob to Alice) directions, the
channel between Alice and Bob can serve as a source of common randomness, which
can further improve secrecy. This common randomness is used in [57] for generation of
a random phase sequence, which is then used to manipulate the transmitted symbols (by
simply multiplying them with the obtained random phase terms). Since the eavesdropper
is unable to find out these random phase values, an enhanced secrecy is attained. In
[58], the authors propose a secure Alamouti scheme using channel reciprocity. In their
proposed approach, after performing a two-way probing, the legitimate users exchange
a secret key based on their received signal strength indicator, and this key is used for
rotation of the PSK constellation from one codeword to the next. A cross-layer analysis
of secure MIMO transmission is given in [59]. It is shown that when using the main
channel as a (not necessarily secret) key between the legitimate users, complexity of
the eavesdropper’s decoding of the legitimate receiver’s message is as hard as solving
standard lattice problems, and it grows exponentially as a factor of number of transmit
antennas.
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F. Performance-Complexity Trade-off in Transmit Signal Design
The iterative algorithms proposed in [39] and [47] for optimizing the precoder matrix
are shown to offer promising results in terms of the achievable secrecy rates. However,
their implementation complexity may be too high for some practical applications. There
are two main reasons for this high computational complexity. First, both the mutual
information and its gradient lack closed-form expressions. Therefore, Monte Carlo sim-
ulations need to be utilized to evaluate them, which require averaging over a large number
of noise realizations in order to maintain a high level of accuracy. More importantly,
evaluation of the mutual information and the minimum MSE (MMSE) term involves
additions over the modulation signal space, which grows exponentially with the number
of transmit antennas, resulting in a prohibitively high computational complexity when
the number of transmit antennas is large.
Different strategies are proposed for lowering the computational complexity associated
with the transmit signal design for secrecy under the finite-alphabet input assumption.
The authors in [39] and [45] derive closed-form approximations for the secrecy rate
expressions using bounds on mutual information. While the former employs the bounds
given in [60], the latter approximates the mutual information using the cut-off rate
expression. The authors in [61]-[62] derive asymptotic secrecy rates in a regime where
the numbers of antennas at the transmitter and both receivers grow infinitely large
with a constant ratio. Maximization of this expression is shown to yield a satisfactory
performance even in the cases of small number of antennas. The authors in [63] and
[47] propose per-group precoding strategies under perfect and partial CSIT assumptions,
respectively. In these works, the channels are diagonalized, and the precoder matrices
are designed by grouping the transmit antennas and designing the precoder matrix for
each group, independently.
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G. Secure Spatial Modulation
Spatial modulation and space shift keying (SSK) are relatively new MIMO transmis-
sion schemes, which rely on encoding information via active antenna indices. Similar
to the amplitude or phase modulation schemes, in spatial modulation and SSK, the
channel inputs are drawn from discrete and finite sets. More specifically, in spatial
modulation [64], the data bits are mapped onto two information carrying blocks: 1) an
antenna index selected from the set of transmit antennas, and 2) a symbol drawn from a
standard constellation. Space shift keying is a special case of spatial modulation where
no amplitude of phase modulation is employed, i.e., the transmit antenna index serves
as the only information carrying unit [65].
Different studies explore the advantages offered by spatial modulation over state-of-
the-art MIMO schemes (see [66] for a comprehensive overview). Along with different
application areas of spatial modulation and SSK, studying these transmission schemes
in the context of physical layer security has been of recent interest. Secrecy capacity
of spatial modulation for the scenarios with two transmit antennas is studied in [67],
and the results are extended to MISOSE and MIMOME scenarios in [68] and [69],
respectively.
Different secure spatial modulation based transmission schemes are also proposed with
the aid of MCSI and ECSI at the transmitter, and for systems with channel reciprocity.
A precoder optimization algorithm for maximizing secrecy rates with SSK transmission
using full CSI is proposed in [70]. The authors in [71] provide a precoder design and
artificial noise injection approach for securing spatial modulation for the scenarios with
passive eavesdroppers (with no ECSI at the transmitter). The secrecy rates of spatial
modulation with artificial noise injection are characterized in [72]. While the conventional
artificial noise injection (similar to what is considered in [72]) requires multiple antennas
to be activated, a novel secure artificial noise aided transmission is introduced in [73],
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TABLE VI: Transmit signal design for secure spatial modulation and SSK.
Paper Model Contributions
S. Sinanovic et al. [67] Nt = 2, NB = NE = 1,
No CSI at the transmitter
Characterize secrecy rates for spatial modulation and SSK
transmission.
X. Guan et al. [68] MISOSE Evaluate the secrecy rates by deriving mutual information
terms and propose a precoding with the aid of full CSI.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and
T. M. Duman [69]
MIMOME, No CSI at the
transmitter
Derive expressions for achievable secrecy rates with spatial
modulation and SSK schemes.
S. Rezaei Aghdam and
T. M. Duman [70]
MIMOME, Full CSI at the
transmitter
Develop an iterative precoder design algorithm.
F. Wu et al. [71] MIMOME, Nt > NB ,
MCSI at the transmitter
Propose a precoder and artificial noise design.
L. Wang et al. [72] MIMOME, Nt > NB ,
MCSI at the transmitter
Characterize the secrecy rates of artificial noise aided spatial
modulation.
Z. Huang et al. [73] MIMOME, MCSI at the
transmitter.
Propose an artificial noise aided secure quadrature spatial
modulation which requires low-complexity hardware.
which requires only two antennas to be activated at each time instance. Existing secure
transmit signal design approaches for spatial modulation and SSK are summarized in
Table VI.
For the scenarios where channel reciprocity holds, a transmit preprocessing technique
is proposed in [74] under the assumption that the training sequences are transmitted from
Bob to Alice, and no CSI is available at the receiver nodes. The authors in [75] propose
a dynamic antenna index assignment based on the main channel when training is carried
out at both directions, which prevents an eavesdropper from obtaining the antenna index
assignment pattern.
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V. MULTI CARRIER WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH DISCRETE INPUTS
A. OFDM Wiretap Channel
Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) provides robustness against mul-
tipath channel fading and offers flexibility in resource allocation. These features have
made OFDM a widely used technique in recent wireless standards including 4G and 5G
wireless systems. In the literature of physical layer security, OFDM can be modeled as
a set of independent parallel channels. It is proved in [77] that the secrecy capacity
of K independent parallel channels (as depicted in Fig. 7) is achieved when each
channel achieves its individual secrecy capacity. For parallel Gaussian wiretap channels,
the optimal input is Gaussian distributed [78]. However, a more practical study of
OFDM wiretap channel is possible via assuming that the data symbols belong to finite
constellations.
An initial study on parallel Gaussian wiretap channels under finite-alphabet inputs is
reported in [33] where the authors characterize the secrecy capacity with PAM inputs.
They also provide a Mercury-waterfilling interpretation of the optimal power allocation
Fig. 7: OFDM wiretap channel modeled as set of independent parallel channels.
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strategy. It is observed in [33] that dissimilar to standard parallel Gaussian channels
(with no constraints on the input distribution), it may not be optimal to use all available
power for PAM inputs. In [79], the OFDM wiretap channel is studied with QAM inputs.
After quantifying the loss in the secrecy rates with respect to the scenarios with Gaussian
inputs, a bit loading strategy is proposed to minimize this loss by assigning an appropriate
number of bits to each subchannel.
The sensitivity of OFDM based transmissions to frequency synchronization errors can
be exploited to provide secure transmission as well. The authors in [80] propose a secure
OFDM transmission over reciprocal channels, which relies on inducing carrier frequency
offset that is pre-compensated (using the transmitter’s knowledge on the MCSI) in
such way that it is received without inter-carrier interference at the legitimate receiver,
while the reception at the eavesdropper receiving the signal through an independent
channel is considerably degraded. In [81], an eavesdropping resilient OFDM scheme is
developed over reciprocal channels where Alice performs a subcarrier interleaving using
her knowledge on the instantaneous MCSI. The legitimate receiver who is also capable
of acquiring the MCSI can obtain the interleaving pattern and de-interleave the received
signals. In contrast, the eavesdropper cannot derive the interleaving pattern initiated by
the transmitter, and as a result, fails to acquire the transmitted information.
Cyclic prefix is used in OFDM systems to avoid inter carrier interference (ICI) incurred
by multi-path channels. However, using cyclic prefix makes the transmission vulnerable
to cyclostationarity based attacks [51]. This temporal degrees of freedom offered by
the cyclic prefix can be used for artificial noise injection so as to improve secrecy over
OFDM wiretap channels. In [82], a single-antenna OFDM wiretap channel is considered
and an artificial noise signal is inserted into the time-domain signal (over the cyclic prefix
samples). A framework for joint optimization of the power allocated to each subcarrier
and artificial noise covariance matrix is also proposed. In [83], Akitaya et al. study the
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application of time-domain artificial noise injection in MIMOME OFDM systems. The
results in [82] and [83] demonstrate that this approach is efficient for improving the
secrecy rates in OFDM wiretap channels.
Efficient resource allocation for secure OFDM systems is formulated as a convex
optimization problem in [84], and solved assuming that the transmitter uses artificial
noise to combat an eavesdropper equipped with multiple antennas. Li et al. [85] propose
scrambling of data in the time domain after the IFFT operation in order to improve
physical layer security for OFDM signals. This, in fact, corresponds to sending modified
constellation points (in terms of phase and amplitude) on each sub-carrier. The authors
in [87] introduce channel frequency response based pre-coder and post-coder designs for
enhancing security in OFDM systems. Their solution relies on extracting orthonormal
matrices via applying singular value decomposition (SVD) on the diagonal matrix of
the legitimate user’s channel frequency amplitude and using it for shuffling OFDM
sub-channels as well as for designing the frequency-based precoder and post-coder. In
[88], physical layer security is studied for passive OFDM-based optical networks where
a scrambled precoding technique is utilized to improve the security. The authors in
[89] propose an efficient approach to enhance secrecy in OFDM systems that relies
on employing an adaptive interleaver maximizing the overall diversity gain delivered
to the legitimate receiver. Hamamreh et al. [86] propose an efficient physical layer
security technique for transmission of OFDM-based waveforms by developing an optimal
joint subcarrier index selection and adaptive interleaver design to enhance the security
and reliability of 5G services. In order to provide QoS based security for OFDM
systems, channel shortening (CS) equalizer coefficients are designed in [90] based on
the legitimate receiver’s channel. Specifically, CS is used at the transmitter in such a
way that the effective channel ensures no ISI at Bob, while causing ISI and performance
degradation at Eve.
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TABLE VII: OFDM wiretap channel with discrete inputs.
Paper Model Contributions
M. R. D. Rodrigues et
al. [33]
Parallel Gaussian Wire-
tap Channels
Characterize secrecy rates with PAM inputs and derive optimal
power allocation strategy.
F. Renna et al. [79] SISOSE Evaluate the secrecy rates for OFDM systems with QAM input
constellations and provide a bit-loading strategy.
M. Yusuf et al. [80] SISOSE with reciprocal
main channel
Suggest inducing carrier frequency offset which is pre-
compensated in the legitimate receiver’s direction.
H. Li et al. [81] SISOSE with reciprocal
main channel
Propose subcarrier interleaving based on the MCSI which pre-
vents eavesdropper from de-interleaving the received signals.
H. Qin et al. [82] SISOSE Introduce a time-domain artificial noise injection approach and
propose a joint optimization of data power and artificial noise
covariance matrix.
T. Akitaya et al. [83] MIMOME Study application time-domain artificial noise injection approach
in multi-antenna scenarios.
M. Yusuf et al. [89] SISOSE with reciprocal
main channel
Employ an interleaving whose pattern is adapted to the main
channel.
J. M. Hamamreh et al.
[86]
SISOSE with reciprocal
main channel
Develop a joint optimal subcarrier index selection and adaptive
interleaving design to enhance the security and reliability
Table VII summarizes important results on the study of OFDM wiretap channels under
the finite-alphabet input assumption.
B. Filter-Bank Multicarrier Wiretap Channel
OFDM systems face important challenges when they are adopted for more complex
networks. For instance, it is very difficult to establish full synchronization for the signals
corresponding to different users in the base station in an orthogonal frequency division
multiple access (OFDMA) network. Furthermore, OFDM introduces significant out of
band interference to other users when it is used to transmit over a set of non-contiguous
frequency bands as in cognitive radios where transmission is limited to certain portions
August 10, 2018 DRAFT
34
of the band and 5G wireless systems [91].
Filter bank multicarrier (FBMC) modulation is shown to be able to resolve the above
problems utilizing high quality filters for transmission, which makes it a potential can-
didate for future networks including 5G. With this motivation, recently, there has been
some interest in the physical layer security aspects of FBMC based networks, as well. In
[92], the authors present a filter hopping FBMC approach for security. They argue that
the choices of filters for each symbol provide a major degree of freedom for the FBMC
waveforms, which can be exploited for security purposes. Furthermore, a mismatch in
the receive filter results in violation of the orthogonality of different subcarriers, and it
causes the energy of a transmit symbol in a certain subcarrier to spread into the adjacent
subcarriers. This effect is shown to be significant even for a slight mismatch of the
filters between the transmitter and the receiver [92]. Such sensitivity can be exploited
for providing physical layer security. For instance, in a practical system, Alice and Bob
can exchange their filter designs by exchanging keys or using a pre-shared sequence of
filters. Then, the transmitter can change the filters continuously, and make it extremely
difficult for an eavesdropper to find the exact filter being used, hence securing the
transmission.
VI. SPREAD SPECTRUM TECHNIQUES FOR PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY
One of the potential methods for improving physical layer security is spread spectrum
(SS) communications. In this method, a signal is spread over a frequency band such that
the resulting bandwidth is much wider than that of the original signal. Historically, this
method has been first used in military applications to achieve transmission schemes
with low probability of intercept (LPI). Two main approaches in SS are direct sequence
spread-spectrum (DSSS) and frequency-hopping spread-spectrum (FHSS). DSSS is used
to spread the transmitted data over multiple frequencies. Similar to a fast hopping
system, FHSS constantly changes the carrier frequency several times per bit duration to
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correspond with a randomly selected channel [93]. In this way, it is extremely difficult
for an eavesdropper to monitor the spread spectrum signals. One of the main advantages
of the SS in comparison to traditional cryptography methods (where the key space is
very large) is that the key space is limited by the range of carrier frequencies.
Code-division multiple access (CDMA), which is based on spread spectrum communi-
cations has also been studied for secure communications in the literature. One important
type of CDMA systems is direct-sequence CDMA (DS-CDMA) where users utilize
different spreading codes to distinguish their signals while they share the same channel
[94]. For a secure DS-CDMA system, the signal from the transmitter is spread using a
code sequence. In order to avoid an eavesdropper to detect the signal, the spread signal
is then scrambled using a pseudo-noise (PN) sequence.
Physical layer security of CDMA systems is studied in [95] based on the use of
relatively long PN scrambling sequences. In most cases, Walsh codes are used to generate
channelization codes for this purpose as they are easy to generate. The authors in [95]
propose a method to generate the scrambling sequences by using advanced encryption
standard (AES) operation. Specifically, they design an AES-CDMA scheme secured
against exhaustive key-search attacks utilizing AES with three different key sizes up to
256.
VII. CONSTELLATION CONSTRAINED MULTIUSER AND COOPERATIVE WIRETAP
CHANNELS
The concept of physical layer security has also been extended to multi-user and
cooperative networks in recent years. In addition to the numerous studies on the limits of
secure communications for scenarios with more than two receivers, multiple transmitters
and presence of relays/jammers/helpers (see [7] for a survey), some recent focus has
also been placed on the practical constellation-constrained secure transmission in these
settings.
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A. Multiuser and Multi-Eve Networks
1) Broadcast Channel with Confidential Messages: The achievable rate region for
Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential messages is characterized for discrete
inputs in [96]. In this scenario, the transmitter’s objective is to send a common message
to two receivers as well as to deliver a confidential message to one of them. Dissimilar
to [32] and [33] where standard constellations are considered, in [96], the symbols are
allowed to be arbitrary, and the achievable secrecy rate region is enlarged by optimizing
the symbol positions and the probability distribution of the symbols. The shrinkage of
the rate region due to employing PAM inputs is quantified with respect to the optimal
Gaussian inputs, and a number of important behavioral differences between these cases
are highlighted.
2) Multiple Access Channels: The authors in [97] focus their attention on the multiple
access wiretap channels (as depicted in Fig. 9) under the assumption that the users
employ the Alamouti STBC scheme. Specifically, they consider a case where multiple
transmitters communicate with one legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Under the assumption that the transmitter has the knowledge of the legitimate channel and
does not know the eavesdropper’s channel gain, an artificial noise injection is proposed
along the null-space of the main channel, which is shown to give rise to considerable
improvements in the secrecy sum-rate.
Fig. 8: Broadcast channel with confidential messages [96].
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Fig. 9: Multiple access wiretap channel studied in [97].
3) Cognitive Radio Networks: The linear precoder design for the cognitive multiple-
access wiretap and the cognitive multi-antenna wiretap channels with finite-alphabet
inputs are studied in [98] and [99], respectively. In [98], the authors consider a setup
in which two secondary-user transmitters are communicating with a secondary-user
receiver in presence of an eavesdropper and under interference threshold constraints at
the primary users. A two-layer precoding algorithm is proposed using statistical CSI at
the transmitters to maximize the ergodic secrecy sum rate. In [99], on the other hand, the
authors study a scenario where a multi-antenna secondary-user transmitter communicates
with a multi-antenna secondary-user receiver, and the communication is wiretapped by
a multi-antenna eavesdropper (Fig. 10). In this work, the precoder matrix is optimized
using an iterative algorithm (assuming statistical CSI of all the channels) so that the
secrecy rate of the secondary user is maximized while power leakage to the primary
user sharing the same frequency spectrum is controlled.
4) Multi-Eavesdropper Scenarios: The authors in [100] study a setup comprised of a
source, a legitimate receiver and multiple multi-antenna eavesdroppers. They first obtain
an expression for an achievable secrecy rate, and then, under the full CSI assumption,
they optimize the transmit power and the beamforming vector. The problem of power
allocation for secrecy over MIMO wiretap channels with multiple eavesdroppers is
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Fig. 10: Cognitive multiple-access wiretap channel studied in [99].
studied in [101]. Under the assumption that the transmitter has perfect MCSI and
statistical ECSI, the proposed power allocation strategy gives non-zero secrecy rates
at high transmit powers. This is important because in the absence of this power control
strategy, secrecy rate decreases with increasing transmit power, and it drops to zero when
the eavesdroppers’ SNRs get higher than a certain value.
B. Relay Channels and Cooperative Communications
Cooperation serves as an efficient method for enhancing secrecy in wireless networks.
In this context, along with the studies conducted on secrecy capacity in various coopera-
tive scenarios, a number of recent studies focus on finite-alphabet inputs as the signaling
scheme. In this context, the secrecy rates achieved with decode-and-forward (DF) relay
beamforming under the finite-alphabet input assumption are characterized in [102]. It is
shown that by optimizing the source power and also the relay weights using the global
CSI, it is possible to prevent the secrecy rates from dropping to zero. The authors in
[103] consider a cooperative jamming network in presence of multiple eavesdroppers,
and develop a secure transmission scheme with finite-alphabet inputs, which relies on a
joint optimization of the artificial noise (injected in the null-space of relay-destination
links) and power allocation among the source and the relays. The study in [104] considers
secure transmission over a MIMOME setup with the aid of a multi-antenna helper, which
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transmits a jamming signal to degrade the signal received by the eavesdropper. Similar
to [103], a framework is provided for joint optimization of the precoder matrix and
power allocation between the transmitter and the helper. Furthermore, low-complexity
transmit signal design schemes are developed for both low and high SNR regimes. The
authors in [105] focus on the problem of secure transmission with cooperative jamming
via an untrusted relay. They propose a power efficient secure DF-based cooperative
communication technique and demonstrate the efficacy of their scheme via simulations
using practical constellation-constrained inputs.
Table VIII summarizes the recent research results of secure transmission over finite-
input multi-user, multi-eavesdropper and cooperative channels.
VIII. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY FOR NEXT GENERATION WIRELESS SYSTEMS
With the advent of the next generation wireless communication systems such as 5G,
a tremendous growth is expected in the number of connected devices. To meet the high
traffic demand, various technologies have emerged during the past years. For instance,
massive MIMO [106], millimeter wave (mmWave) communication systems [107], full
duplex transmission [114] and non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) [115] have
attracted significant interest from researchers both in industry and academia.
Exploiting large antenna arrays and taking advantage of a spectrum from 30 GHz to
300 GHz away from the almost fully occupied spectral band, have proven to provide
various benefits, which make these technologies key enablers for the next generation
wireless systems and beyond. Along with the different aspects of massive MIMO and
mmWave communications, investigating their potential in providing physical layer se-
curity has been of recent interest (see e.g., [108]-[113]). The problem of linear precoder
design for large-scale (massive) MIMO wiretap channel under the finite-alphabet input
assumption is investigated in [63] where GSVD-based precoder design is shown to
achieve the maximal secrecy rate at high SNR values. The potential of large antenna
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TABLE VIII: Multi-user, multi-eavesdropper and cooperative secure transmission with
discrete inputs.
Paper Network Contributions
Z. Mheich et al. [96] Broadcast channel with
confidential message
Characterize secrecy rate region with PAM inputs and enhance it by
optimizing symbol positions and the joint probability distribution.
T. Allen et al. [97] MAC Wiretap Develop a secure Alamouti transmission with artificial noise injec-
tion with perfect MCSI and statistical ECSI.
J. Jin et al. [98] Cognitive MAC Wiretap A two-layer precoding is proposed using statistical CSI to maxi-
mize secrecy sum-rate.
W. Zeng et al. [99] Cognitive Multi-Antenna
Wiretap
Propose an iterative precoder optimization algorithm with statistical
CSI.
K. Cao et al. [100] MISO Wiretap with
Multiple Multi-Antenna
Eavesdroppers
Study joint optimization of beamforming vector and transmitting
power with full CSI.
S. Vishwakarma et al.
[101]
MIMO Wiretap with Mul-
tiple Eavesdroppers
Employ a power allocation strategy with perfect MCSI and statis-
tical ECSI.
S. Vishwakarma et al.
[102]
DF Relaying in Presence
of Multiple Eavesdroppers
Optimize the source power and the relay weights with the aid of
full CSI such that the secrecy rate is maximized.
K. Cao et al. [103] Cooperative Jamming
Network in Presence of
Multiple Eavesdroppers
Provide a joint optimization of the artificial noise and the power
allocated between the source and the relays.
K. Cao et al. [104] MIMOME and a Multi-
Antenna Helper
Propose a joint optimization of precoder and power allocation
between the source and the helper
H. M. Furqan et al.
[105]
Cooperative communica-
tions with untrusted relay
Propose a destination-assisted jamming for improving secrecy and
power efficiency.
arrays to realize secure directional modulation at mmWave frequencies is demonstrated
in [116] where the proposed solution relies on driving only a subset of antennas in
the array and choosing the switching configuration such that the desired modulation
symbols are received at the legitimate receiver while scrambling the constellation in
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other (undesired) directions. The authors in [117] propose an antenna selection-aided
secure mmWave transmission using a switched phased array architecture in large-scale
transmit antenna arrays. We note that, different from the solution proposed in [116],
which requires modulation at the RF end, the scheme in [117] can use the traditional
baseband modulation.
Offering several advantages such as high throughput, low latency and improved con-
nectivity, NOMA is one of the key enabling technologies for next generation wireless
networks. It relies on removing the orthogonality (which exists in the conventional mul-
tiple access techniques), and assigning a specific resource block (e.g., time or frequency)
to more than one user. Investigating the security issues of NOMA has been a topic of
recent interest. For instance, the secrecy performance of large-scale NOMA networks is
studied in [118] where their secrecy outage probability is derived for both single-antenna
and multi-antenna transmitter scenarios. Proposing eavesdropping resilient transmission
schemes with NOMA (especially, under a discrete signaling assumption) is an interesting
research direction, which is left for future work as also stated in [119].
Full duplex wireless communication is another promising technology, which is ex-
pected to lead to a considerable increase in spectral efficiency. Transmission via full
duplex communications allows for simultaneous transmitting and receiving of informa-
tion signal at the same time and within the same frequency band. In theory, the spectral
efficiency can be doubled via full duplex transmission with respect to the conventional
half duplex systems. The research on physical layer security in the scenarios where
different nodes are capable of full duplex operation is a hot research topic (for an
overview, see [11, Section VII]). However, only a limited number of the existing studies
focus their attention to practical constellation-constrained scenarios. One example of
such studies is reported in [120] where secure communications in presence of full duplex
relays is investigated under the assumption that the transmitter employs an Alamouti-
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based rank-two beamforming scheme.
Waveform design for 5G has also been a topic of interest during the past years. In
addition to an increased bandwidth efficiency and reduced inter-user interference, new
waveforms may also provide gains in terms of secrecy. For instance, the authors in [121]
propose a secure waveform design for 5G wireless systems referred to as orthogonal
transform division multiplexing (OTDM), which relies on replacing Fourier transform
blocks in conventional OFDM systems by new blocks allowing for diagonalization of
the main channel while degrading the eavesdropper’s reception.
We conclude this section by noting that the relatively recent paradigm of Internet
of things (IoT) is expected to offer connectivity to billions of devices and it will be a
centerpiece in the next generation wireless technologies including 5G. In view of the fact
that, IoT systems are expected to consist of a large number of devices, the conventional
cryptographic solutions, which require key distribution and management, may be too
complex to be implemented. Accordingly, physical layer security techniques (especially,
the ones which possess a lower complexity) can play an important role in safeguarding
IoT. A recent survey paper [122] provides a thorough discussion of the potentials of
physical layer security techniques and pinpoints a number of candidate schemes that
can serve as an alternative or complement to the key-based solutions in securing IoT
communications.
IX. PRACTICAL WIRETAP CODE CONSTRUCTIONS
The achievability of the secrecy rates described in the previous sections is proved
with the aid of random coding arguments, i.e., from an information theoretic point of
view. However, in practice, one needs to realize secure communications with the aid
of practical codes. In this regard, explicit and implementable code design for secrecy
has also been a topic of recent interest in the literature. In particular, error-correcting
codes have found a new role since the emergence of physical layer security. Aside from
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providing reliable transmission, carefully designed codes are also capable of securing
the transmitted messages against an eavesdropper. On the other hand, it seems intriguing
to design these codes because they are required to meet two conflicting requirements: 1)
they tend to add more redundancy to the codewords in order to counter the randomness
of the channel and provide reliable communication, and 2) in order to offer a secure
transmission, they need to maximize the randomness perceived at the eavesdropper by
reducing the redundancy.
An important step towards designing codes for the wiretap channel is choosing a metric
for measuring security. In contrast to measuring reliability where probability of error is
being used as a universally accepted metric, there are multiple metrics for quantifying
secrecy for this scenario as listed in Table I. Computation of these metrics for explicit
finite length coding schemes, however, has been limited to some specific channels2. One
example is [123] in which the authors apply semantic secrecy to a finite length Reed-
Muller code used over a binary erasure channel (BEC). For AWGN channels, a BER
based metric called security gap (as mentioned in Section II-D2) is widely used by the
research community, which is easily applicable to all practical coding schemes, however,
its relation to the information theoretic notions is not established in a rigorous manner.
Security gap is defined as the difference between the qualities (SNRs) of the main
and the eavesdropper’s channels. For AWGN channels without feedback, this value must
be greater than zero in order to result in a positive secrecy capacity (which equals to
the difference between the capacities of the main and the eavesdropper’s channels [18]).
Small security gaps are desirable because they make physical layer security achievable
even with a small degradation of the eavesdropper’s channel with respect to the main
one. An analytical definition of the security gap can be given as follows. Let us fix
2The authors in [139] provide a coding scheme for an AWGN channel, which satisfy strong secrecy using capacity
approaching codes of infinite length and hash functions.
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two threshold values for the maximum desired BER over the main channel (denoted by
PmaxB ≤ 12 ) and and the minimum desired BER at the eavesdropper (denoted by PminE > 0).
Then, the security gap equals the difference between the SNR values corresponding to
these two, i.e., SNRB − SNRE measured in dBs.
The major shortcoming of the above BER-based analysis is that it assumes that if
Pmineve ≈ 0.5, then Eve cannot extract any information about the secret message. However,
if there exists any statistical correlation between the bit errors or between the Eve’s
observation and the transmitted message, the amount of leaked information will not
be zero. The authors in [129] employ tools from cryptography literature to eliminate
such correlations. Specifically, they propose the use of substitution permutation networks
(SPNs) without any secret key to satisfy the strict avalanche criterion (SAC) and the bit
independence criterion (BIC). The required SPNs can be implemented efficiently [129],
hence, they can be applied to the message bits before the encoding stage. Therefore,
one can design practical coding schemes, which result in BER very close to 0.5 with
no (or, small) correlation at Eve.
The general coding scheme for physical layer security is the randomized encoding
proposed by Wyner in [15] to prove that there exists a code that achieves the secrecy
capacity of the degraded wiretap channel. This method is also known as coset-coding
studied further in the subsequent literature, e.g., in [124] and [125]. In this method, all-
zero message is mapped to a code C, with generator matrix G, and a non-zero message
s = [s1, s2, ..., sk] is mapped to the coset obtained by adding the n-tuple s1h1 + s2h2 +
...+ skhk to all the codewords in C where hi’s are linearly independent n-tuples outsideC. Assuming hi’s form a matrix H of size k × n, the transmitted codeword through the
channel is
c = [s v] ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
H
G
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ (18)
where v = [v1, v2, ..., vr] denotes the random bit vector used for choosing a codeword in
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the corresponding coset uniformly randomly. Fig. 11 illustrates this method where small
code is denoted by C and cij denotes the ith codeword in the j th coset. We note that
in conventional encoding, the leakage of information about the secret message to Eve,
H(SK ∣Zn), is equal to the leakage of the codewords H(cn∣Zn) [123] since there is a one-
to-one mapping between the messages and the codewords. In the randomized encoding
scheme, however, this is not true anymore since different codewords may represent the
same message.
Fig. 11: Illustration of the coset coding scheme.
Application of lattice codes to the Gaussian wiretap channel is studied in [126] where
the authors define an alternative security metric (called secrecy gain), which is related
to the theta series of lattices and shows the amount of confusion at the eavesdropper.
Without introducing a decoding method, they evaluate the performance of different
lattices based on the secrecy gain. The confusion at the eavesdropper in [126] is the result
of using a random lattice in addition to the lattice that is responsible for transmitting the
original message. As a further development, the authors in [127] prove the existence of
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TABLE IX: Practical coding schemes aiming at reducing the security gap over AWGN
channel.
Paper Secure coding scheme Contributions
D. Klinc et al. [128] Punctured LDPC codes Propose puncturing information bits in LDPC codes in
order to confuse Eve.
M. Baldi et al. [130] Non-systematic codes Make use of scrambling technique at encoding which
amplifies the resulting errors at decoding stage.
M. Baldi et al. [131] Coding with scrambling, con-
catenation, and HARQ
Investigate different techniques to reduce the resulting
security gaps.
Y. X. Zhang et al. [133] Polar-LDPC concatenated
codes
Evaluate performance of a serially concatenated coding
scheme consists of polar and LDPC codes.
A. Nooraiepour and T. M.
Duman [132]
Randomized convolutional and
turbo codes
Construct coset codes based on convolutional and turbo
codes using dual codes.
lattices that are semantically secure in the Gaussian wiretap channel.
The authors in [137] and [138] provide a lower bound on the mutual information be-
tween the secret message and Eve’s observation. They utilize this lower bound to quantify
the equivocation for finite length codes for Gaussian wiretap channels. Specifically, they
use finite length LDPC codes and demonstrate the achievable points in the equivocation-
rate region. In [136], the level of security at the physical layer is assessed from the
information theoretic standpoint while taking into account the constraints of practical
transmissions over realistic wireless wiretap channels, i.e., by considering practical codes
with finite length, discrete modulation formats and continuous channels with fading.
Several practical coding schemes aiming directly at reducing the security gap are
also proposed in the literature. Specifically, punctured LDPC codes are exploited for
physical layer security in [128]. Furthermore, [130] demonstrates how non-systematic
codes can be effective to reduce the resulting security gap, while [131] applies different
techniques including scrambling, concatenation, and hybrid automatic repeat-request to
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RC, n=2056, k=1020, r=252
Punctured LDPC, n=2364, k=1576
RSCCC, n=8004, k=r=2000
RSCLDGM, n=10004, k=2250, r=250
S RSCCC, n=10004, k=r=2500
S RSCLDGM, n=10004, k=2250, r=250
Fig. 12: The resulting security gaps from practical coding schemes. n, k and r denote
length of a code, number of data bits and number of random bits, respectively. S means
scrambling has been applied. Taken from [132] and [135].
LDPC and BCH codes in order to further reduce the security gap. Concatenation of
polar and LDPC codes are proposed in [133]. Coset codes based on convolutional and
turbo codes are constructed in [132] and [134] for physical layer security. Moreover,
application of serially concatenated low density generator matrix (SCLDGM) codes to
the randomized scheme is studied in [135].
Authors in [139] introduce a method, which provides strong secrecy for the Gaussian
wiretap channel by means of hash functions and capacity approaching channel codes
of infinite length. Using this scheme, it is also possible to quantify the level of leakage
obtained for a fixed block length. Finally, [140] provides the maximal secrecy rate over
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a wiretap channel subject to reliability and secrecy constraints at a given block length.
Table IX summarizes the existing practical coding schemes for Gaussian wiretap
channel along with their main contributions. Furthermore, Fig. 12 demonstrates the
relation between the resulting security gaps from some of these practical coding schemes3
and a specific BER at Eve. One can see that when a BER of 0.5 is desired at Eve, security
gaps as small as 1 dB can be obtained using carefully designed codes of length 104 or
longer.
In addition to the Gaussian wiretap channels, some efforts are also made to develop
practical coding schemes for fading wiretap channels. The authors in [141] and [142]
propose polar coding schemes for achieving secrecy over block fading wiretap channels.
In [141], the secure coding scheme is designed with the aid of instantaneous MCSI and
ECSI. However, the polar coding approach proposed in [142] relies on statistical CSI of
both channels. Application of algebraic lattice codes is also proposed over block fading
wiretap channels. For instance, a sequence of non-random lattice codes is developed in
[143] that achieve strong secrecy and semantic security over ergodic fading channels.
We emphasize that the easy-to-compute property of security gap makes it a widely
used metric in majority of the aforementioned code designs, which try to avoid potential
complexities associated with computing the original information-theoretic metrics for
finite-length scenarios. Despite some limited efforts such as [138] in providing a lower
bound for information-theoretic metrics (Table I), the literature of physical layer security
still lacks a comprehensive and satisfactory finite length analysis of different metrics
especially for AWGN and fading wiretap channels.
3RSCCC stands for randomized serially concatenated convolutional codes scheme, RC stands for randomized
convolutional codes scheme and RSCLDGM corresponds to the randomized SCLDGM codes.
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X. LESSONS LEARNED AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD
We now provide a summary of the lessons learned and discuss a number of challenges
ahead and present some directions for future research in this area.
A. Lessons Learned
The usual approaches for designing secure transmit signals with Gaussian inputs lead
to considerable losses when applied to the signals drawn from finite constellations. This
fact motivates the need for development of secure transmission schemes under the finite-
alphabet input assumption.
In single-antenna transmission with constellation constrained inputs, achieving secrecy
requires adoption of a proper power allocation strategy. This is because transmission with
full power may allow the eavesdropper to successfully detect the transmitted symbols.
Moreover, the increased dimensionality in multi-antenna transmissions can be employed
to enhance secrecy under finite-alphabet inputs. Precoding serves as a promising strategy
for maximizing the quality difference between the signals received at the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper. Artificial noise injection offers considerable secrecy gains
and it well-suits the nature of secure transmission with finite-alphabet inputs since the
optimal power, which is allocated to the information bearing signal is only a fraction
of the total power, and the excess power can be used for artificial noise injection. In
many cases (especially, in the absence of instantaneous ECSI), without artificial noise
injection, secrecy rates drop to zero when the transmit power increases. Therefore,
injecting artificial noise is crucial for guaranteeing a good saturation behavior at high
SNRs.
The optimal secure transmission schemes are not known in closed-form in almost all
of the scenarios studied in this survey. This is due to the non-convexity of the objective
function (i.e., secrecy rate). Furthermore, the transmit signal design algorithms, which
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rely on direct maximization of secrecy rates, are computationally complex mainly due to
the fact that the mutual information expression under finite-alphabet inputs lacks closed-
form. Therefore, different studies focus their attention on proposing lower-complexity
alternatives to direct secrecy rate maximization. There is also an important trade-off
between the secrecy rates and the computational complexity of the existing solutions
in the literature of physical layer security with finite-alphabet inputs. Moreover, it is
noteworthy that the transmit signal designs based on metrics such as SINR or BER,
though simple and may be practical in some scenarios, do not ensure secrecy in an
information theoretic sense.
The amount of CSI at the transmitter plays a central role in determining the secrecy
performance of a particular transmission scheme. Transmission algorithms employing full
CSI typically have a high capability in simultaneously increasing the information rates
at the legitimate receiver and suppressing the reception at the eavesdropper, however,
acquiring a perfect instantaneous CSI of the eavesdropper may not be practically possible
in many scenarios. The achievable secrecy rates undergo considerable losses in the
absence of instantaneous ECSI. However, nonzero secrecy rates are still attainable with
the aid of statistical ECSI or in some cases even without it (i.e., with the aid of the
MCSI only).
Secure transmission design over multiuser channels, e.g., broadcast channel, is a
more challenging task compared to the point-to-point scenarios. This is because the
proposed solutions need to meet additional requirements e.g., in terms of inter-user
interference. Similarly, various challenges arise when moving to the scenarios with
multiple eavesdroppers. For instance, secure transmission along the null-space of the
eavesdropper’s channel is no longer possible in these scenarios and designing an artificial
noise signal which effectively degrades the reception at the eavesdroppers is more
complex than the single-eavesdropper case.
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Practical coding schemes exploit different tools from coding theory and cryptography
in order to ensure a certain level of security and reliability (in terms of BERs) for Eve
and Bob, respectively. By combining coset coding and scrambling approaches along with
code concatenation, security gaps as small as 1 dB can be obtained using finite-length
explicit and implementable codes. However, finding specific (and implementable) finite-
length codes, which can provide physical layer security from an information-theoretic
point of view, remains as a future challenge.
B. Challenges and Open Problems
Various studies have been carried out on physical layer security with discrete signaling
with the objective of bridging the gap between the information theoretic limits of secrecy
and practical and implementable secure transmission schemes. However, there still are
many important open problems and future challenges to be addressed in this area.
Physical layer security with finite-alphabet inputs has been studied only for a limited
set of CSI scenarios including the cases with perfect and statistical MCSI and ECSI at
the transmitter. Some other important scenarios regarding the CSI uncertainty at different
nodes, e.g., noisy estimation of CSI, outdated CSI or limited CSI feedback, which are
well-investigated under the Gaussian input assumption [8], have not yet been considered
for cases with finite-alphabet inputs. It would be interesting and of significant practical
value to quantify the losses in the secrecy rates under these different imperfect CSI
scenarios in the context of finite-alphabet inputs.
While the majority of artificial noise injection strategies rely on transmitting Gaussian
distributed noise either by aligning it in the null-space of the main channel or by opti-
mizing its covariance matrix, such artificial noise signals are not necessarily optimal. For
instance, it has been shown in [144] that the worst case noise for AWGN channels with
binary inputs has a discrete distribution. This motivates seeking interference distributions
(rather than merely optimizing covariance matrices of Gaussian distributed signals),
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which maximize secrecy rates.
While some steps have been taken in studying physical layer security over finite-
input multiuser networks (as surveyed in Section VII), many important scenarios have
not yet been tackled. For example, no results have been reported for interference channels
with secrecy constraints under the finite-alphabet input assumption (for an example
with Gaussian inputs refer to [145]). Secrecy issues concerning the networks with
simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) is also a topic of re-
cent interest [146]. It is demonstrated that SWIPT networks are prone to information
leakage at the energy receivers, and hence, the main focus of the existing articles is
the characterization of the trade-off between the secrecy capacity/rate and the harvested
power in these networks [147]-[149]. Studying this trade-off under practical discrete
signaling assumption is an important subject for future research. Furthermore, physical
layer security in heterogeneous networks [150] and with full duplex transmitter or
receivers (see, e.g. [151] and [152]) are other hot topics in this area, and extending
the existing results for these scenarios to the case of finite-alphabet inputs constitutes
another important direction for future research.
Massive MIMO systems provide considerable gains in secrecy capacity. Besides op-
portunities offered, many challenges arise in secure transmit signal designs with finite-
alphabet inputs. For instance, most of the existing precoder design approaches (such as
the ones proposed in [39] and [47]) are intractable when the number of antennas is high.
Secure mmWave transmission is another promising research frontier. Communicating
at the mmWave spectrum considerably changes the channel model with respect to
the microwave communication systems, and introduces some new features (e.g., high
sensitivity to blockages and considerable differences between the line-of-sight and non-
line-of-sight receptions), which motivates development of new frameworks for designing
practical secure transmission schemes.
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Taking into account the hardware constraints in designing secure massive MIMO
design is another topic worth investigating. For example, secure transmission schemes
can be proposed with finite-alphabet inputs for multi-antenna transmitters with a single
radio frequency (RF) chain (or a few, but less than the number of antennas). Performance
of wireless systems can be considerably affected by different RF impairments such as
impairments such as inphase/quadrature-phase (I/Q) imbalance, phase noise or distortions
due to the nonlinear power amplifiers, which degrade the reception at the receivers
(including the eavesdropper); hence, this behavior can be exploited to enhance secrecy.
Moreover, various practical constraints arise in IoT systems (e.g., in terms of complex-
ity and energy efficiency) that should be considered in designing secure transmission
schemes. We also note that, designing testbeds and conducting tests by implementing
physical layer security schemes is an essential step, which should be taken before these
techniques can be adopted by actual communication systems. One example of such
experiments is reported in [153] where the authors evaluate the secrecy performance of
coset coding of lattice constellations with the aid of a software defined radio testbed.
Another interesting direction for future work is to further develop cross-layer design
based solutions for securing communications as only a limited number of works have
been reported on this topic so far. For instance, the authors in [154] demonstrate the
advantages of cross-layer protocol interactions on the achievable secrecy by joint ex-
ploitation of automatic-repeat-request (as a MAC layer operation) and maximal ratio
combining (as a physical layer operation). The potentials of other layers can also be
taken advantage of to enhance security. For instance, employing authentication and wa-
termarking strategies at the application layer along with the coding and signal processing
at the physical layer [155] can be lead to considerable secrecy gains.
The main problem associated with designing practical coding schemes for physical
layer security is the following: Although the security gap is proposed and used as an
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alternative practical metric, the most widely accepted one (i.e., equivocation) relies on
information theoretic quantities, and computing these quantities for finite-length codes
over AWGN channels is a challenging problem, and can be a promising research direction
on physical layer security. As a final suggestion for future research, we recommend the
problem of precoder design in the scenarios where practical wiretap codes are employed,
which would be an important step towards designing implementable secure transmission
schemes.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
An obligatory step towards practical implementation of physical layer security is un-
derstanding the impacts of employing standard constellations on the secrecy performance.
With this motivation, this survey paper provides a summary of the current literature on
physical layer security with discrete signaling and practical codes. We outline why and
how transmit signal design problem is different for the case of finite-alphabet inputs
compared to the case of Gaussian signals, and review existing algorithms for maximizing
secrecy rates in a variety of scenarios. We also provide an overview on practical code
constructions for physical layer security, and point out important challenges and open
problems on this topic.
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